How Much Has The Bubble of Support Deflated? The era of optimism and loyalty in public sentiment is becoming a thing of the past

An authoritarian artefact and two peaks

It is important to remember that the 'Putin rating' is, in itself, an authoritarian artefact. As Figure 1 shows, there are two principal states of presidential approval. The lower range lies between 60% and 70% approval, while the higher range falls between 80% and 90%. Even the lower range would be considered anomalous by the standards of democratic countries, where such consistently high levels of support are rare. This reflects not so much Putin's managerial abilities, any exceptional affection for him among Russians, or an innate preference for strongman rule, as the nature of the media environment and public sphere under authoritarianism. The inflation of support that produces elevated approval ratings for leaders and governments in non-democratic regimes is typically linked to information manipulation. Citizens approve of rulers not necessarily because they govern effectively, but because they are exposed to limited criticism and abundant praise (→ Guriev, Treisman: Spin Dictators). They may also be inclined to align themselves with what they perceive to be the majority view, believing that most other citizens support the leader (→ Rogov: Supermajority for Superpresidency; Buckley et al: Endogenous Popularity), or they may judge the costs and risks of expressing disapproval in surveys to be high.

Figure 1. Putin’s approval rating and satisfaction with the state of affairs in the country, 2011–2026, % of those surveyed

Although ‘Putin’s rating’ is therefore a distorted indicator that should not be interpreted literally, its rises and falls nevertheless reflect broader shifts in the public mood. Following the launch of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, just as after the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of the hybrid war in eastern Ukraine in 2014, the much-discussed rating surged into the 80–85% range (the higher register), increasing by roughly 20 percentage points. However, in both cases, it is not entirely accurate to say that Putin's personal rating increased. What rose, almost magically, were positive assessments not only of Putin's performance but also of all branches of government, the overall state of affairs in the country, and even some forward-looking evaluations of economic prospects. It is therefore misleading to speak simply of an increase in support for Putin. Rather, what changed was the general disposition of survey respondents: they became markedly more loyal and more positive in their assessments across a wide range of issues.

Figure 2. Trends in approval ratings for government institutions and the state of affairs in the country following the annexation of Crimea (2014) and the start of full-scale war with Ukraine (2022), % of those surveyed

The effect of heightened loyalty towards national authorities during an external conflict is well known in sociology and is commonly referred to as the ‘rally-round-the-flag’ effect. In democratic countries, however, such rallies are rarely as pronounced or as durable as those observed in Russia over the past two decades. Particularly striking is the fact that, immediately after the invasion began in 2022, the share of those surveyed saying that 'the country is moving in the right direction' increased by 50%. One might conclude that Russians had simply been waiting for war, sanctions and the departure of foreign brands. In reality, the first month of the war and sanctions brought a 50% devaluation of the rouble, from around 80 to 120 roubles to the US dollar. The Central Bank suspended trading and imposed restrictions on foreign-currency withdrawals in an effort to contain banking panic. Educated urban Russians were gripped by shock and fear, reflected in the departure of several hundred thousand people from the country. Less educated segments of society were characterised by confusion, uncertainty and anxiety. Unlike in 2014, genuine enthusiasm for events was difficult to find, particularly given that parts of the Russian army suffered major setbacks around Kyiv during the first few weeks of the war.

Thus, although the two peaks of support shown in Figure 1 appear almost identical, they differ substantially in substance. To some extent, the second peak may indeed reflect a rally-round-the-flag effect, namely emotional mobilisation in response to a perceived external threat, even if that threat was largely imagined. However, it is important to remember that public opposition to the war was criminalised as early as March 2022. Russia was rapidly descending into an atmosphere of fear, which almost certainly affected survey quality and the broader climate of opinion. The surveys themselves indicate that people holding critical views of the authorities were between two and two-and-a-half times more likely than loyalists to regard participation in opinion polls as personally risky. This would inevitably have affected their willingness to engage with pollsters (→ Re:Russia: Pro-War Spring). Likewise, in several survey waves conducted on the eve of the war, around 40% of those surveyed by the Levada Center claimed to have voted for United Russia in the September 2021 parliamentary election. After the invasion, the share giving this answer rose above 50%. One possible explanation is that respondents retrospectively attributed a vote for United Russia to themselves even when they had not actually cast one. A more plausible interpretation, however, is that the composition of survey respondents shifted towards more loyal citizens, among whom support for the ruling party was naturally higher (→ Re:Russia: A Broad Front of Inadequacy).

Be that as it may, when examining the two peaks in Figure 1, one should not lose sight of the radically different public atmospheres and opinion climates that underlay them. The 2014 episode is better understood as a bandwagon effect, whereby the patriotic enthusiasm of one segment of society over the 'return of Crimea' encouraged others to align themselves with the triumphant majority. The second episode is more consistent with a spiral of silence, in which fear of social condemnation and repression discourages dissenters from expressing their views, thereby creating the impression of near-unanimous support for the war and for the authorities that launched it.

How much has the support bubble deflated?

It is all the more striking, therefore, that, as in the previous episode, the current bubble of overwhelming support appears to have begun deflating exactly four years after it first inflated. In 2018, the trigger for its rapid collapse was the announcement of an increase in the retirement age. In June, when the relevant legislation was introduced in the State Duma, Putin's approval rating fell by 14 percentage points in both the FOM and Levada Center surveys. Assessments of the state of affairs in the country declined by a further 10 percentage points in Levada's polling. The near-vertical drop is clearly visible in Figure 1.

In the current episode, no trigger of comparable magnitude is yet apparent. Moreover, a decline in Putin's approval rating alone does not necessarily indicate that the bubble is destined to burst. According to data from the Levada Center, Putin's approval averaged 84% between March 2021 and December 2025 and reached 86% on average during 2024–2025. The decline recorded in April therefore amounted to only 7 percentage points and does not, by itself, demonstrate an irreversible change in direction. However, a broader picture emerges when one considers the entire cluster of indicators measuring attitudes towards the authorities, including evaluations of the president, prime minister, government and State Duma. In 2025, average approval levels across this group stood 23 percentage points above their pre-war baseline. Over the past six months, however, they have fallen by an average of 13 percentage points, eliminating exactly half of the wartime increase (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Trends in approval ratings for government institutions and the state of affairs in the country during the war years, 2021–2026, % of those surveyed

The decline in assessments of the state of affairs in the country appears particularly significant. From March 2022 through the end of 2025, an average of 68% of those surveyed believed that Russia was moving in the right direction. During January–September 2025, the figure was even higher at 71%, compared with 48% in the pre-war year of 2021. By February 2026, however, it had fallen to 64%, then to 61% in March and 55% in April. In other words, it declined by more than 15 percentage points in the space of six months along a fairly steep trajectory, reversing roughly two-thirds of the wartime surge. The proportion of those who believe that the country was moving in the wrong direction averaged 42% in 2021. Between March 2022 and the end of 2025, that figure contracted to 20%, and between early 2024 and September 2025 it fell further to 17%. By April–May 2026, however, it had risen to 27%. Responses to a similar question asked by VTsIOM also show a sharp decline in March–April. There is no similar question in the published FOM data, but in responses to an indicative question about the mood of those around them, those surveyed described the mood of those around them as 'calm' rather than 'anxious' by a margin of 53% to 39%. By May 2026, the balance had almost completely reversed, standing at 42% versus 51%.

Taken together, this data indicates that we are dealing with a real contraction in the level of overwhelming support in opinion polls, which has been taking place over a six-month period, beginning in autumn 2025, with most indicators deteriorating from October onwards. The contraction has been uneven across measures. In the most politicised segment, represented by presidential approval ratings, roughly one-third of the wartime surge has dissipated. In less politicised indicators, such as assessments of the country's direction, nearly two-thirds of the increase has disappeared. This implies that, within a survey sample already skewed towards more loyal constituencies, approximately 10% of those surveyed who joined the camp of near-universal approval in 2022 have now left it.

Experts generally point to three factors behind the deterioration in public sentiment: fatigue with a war that has reached a stalemate and is increasingly felt inside Russia itself; the authorities' tightening control over the internet and social media; and a worsening economic situation. According to data from the Levada Center, the proportion of those who believe that military operations in Ukraine should continue fell to a quarter of those surveyed at the start of 2026, compared to around a third at the start of 2025. In FOM’s weekly polls, ‘shelling of Russian territories’ has consistently topped the list of memorable events since the second half of April 2026. Meanwhile, internet and social-media restrictions had disrupted the lives of two-thirds of those surveyed, according to the Levada Center’s March survey.

Indicators of economic wellbeing also began to deteriorate in autumn 2025, following almost two years of relative prosperity and optimism. According to FOM's regular monitoring of social well-being, throughout most of 2025, 20% of those surveyed reported that their material circumstances had worsened over the preceding two to three months, while 11% said they had improved. From October onwards these figures steadily shifted, reaching 27% and 8%, respectively, by April–May 2026. Such a balance of responses was last typical in 2022. Projected expectations of personal financial circumstances have also weakened. During 2024 and most of 2025, positive expectations outnumbered negative ones by 28% to 12%. By April–May 2026, the balance had narrowed considerably, to 23% versus 18%.

Throughout 2024 and up to September 2025, an average of 34% expected life in the country to improve over the following six to twelve months, while only 12% anticipated deterioration. By the turn of 2025–2026, the balance had shifted to 27% versus 17%, and by April the two groups had converged at 21% each (Figure 4). This final indicator deserves particular attention, as such a level of pessimism had not been observed at any point during the four years of the support bubble. Even in March 2022, amid the sanctions-induced economic shock, 33% of those surveyed by FOM expected conditions to improve, while only 26% expected them to worsen. Thereafter, the advantage enjoyed by optimists only widened. The unusually elevated optimism that characterised the support bubble has now, it would appear, largely disappeared.

Figure 4. Social expectations: how will life in the country change over the next six to twelve months? 2021–2026, % of those surveyed

Summarising these findings, it can be noted, firstly, that the deterioration in socio-economic assessments and expectations also began in the autumn of 2025, and, secondly, that actual assessments of financial circumstances (pocketbook evaluations) have so far worsened only moderately, whereas social sentiments (sociotropic evaluations) and expectations deteriorated sharply in the spring of 2026. Data from the Levada Center’s Social Sentiment Index, which aggregates responses to several survey questions, are only available up to March, but broadly confirm the same trend. The overall index declined from a peak of 137 points in March–May 2025 to 127 in November and 117 in March 2026. Within this, the sub-index measuring family wellbeing fell by 14 points over the year, the Russia-wide assessment sub-index by 18 points, and the expectations sub-index by 27 points.

The deflation of the bubble of support certainly is, of course, not in itself a threat to regime stability. First, the process is still only part way through. Second, the Putin regime has experienced periods of low-regime-support 'register' in the past, notably in 2011–2013 and 2019–2021. On each occasion, political turbulence increased, opposition sentiments became more articulated, and protest activity rose, but without reaching critical thresholds. The level of repression in the second of these periods was higher than in the first, and today it is significantly higher still than in the pre-war years. Nevertheless, it can be stated with some confidence that the deflation of the support bubble signals the entry of the Putin system into a more turbulent phase, set against the backdrop of a protracted military stalemate and deepening structural imbalances in the economy.